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Price stability is widely recognised as the primary goal of modern monetary 
policy, and the management of private sector inflation expectations has become 
an essential channel through which this goal is achieved.  This evaluation aims to 
improve the understanding of how the sensitivity of private sector inflation 
expectations to macroeconomic surprises in South Africa compares 
internationally, as this provides an indication of the contribution of monetary 
policy in South Africa to anchoring inflation expectations.  If a central bank is 
credible, the financial markets should react less sensitively to macroeconomics 
surprises,  because they trust the central bank to manage these incidents and 
achieve the objectives they communicated over the medium to long term.  In this 
paper, the methodology of Gurkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) is adopted in 
order to measure the sensitivity of South African inflation expectations to 
surprises.  A comparison of South Africa’s results with those of countries in the 
original studies supports the contention that the SARB (South African Reserve 
Bank) has encouraged inflation expectations to be relatively insensitive to 
macroeconomic surprises, and offers support for the inflation targeting framework 
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 1.  INTRODUCTION 
The maintenance of price stability is widely recognised as the primary goal of modern 
monetary policy, and the management of private sector inflation expectations has become 
an essential channel through which this goal is achieved.  The inflation targeting 
framework for monetary policy adopted by the SARB is a forward-looking regime.  At its 
core, it claims to anchor private sector inflation expectations, facilitating the achievement 
of price stability while limiting the output sacrifice (South African Reserve Bank, 2002).  
This central claim is evaluated in this paper and it is found that the SARB’s success at 
anchoring inflation expectations in the face of macroeconomic surprises compares well 
with other leading inflation targeters.   
 
Section 2 provides a theoretical exploration of modern monetary policy and section 3 
reviews the available evidence regarding the transparency and credibility of South African 
monetary policy.  The methodology of Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) is 
adopted in section 4 in order to measure the sensitivity of South Africa’s  inflation 
expectations to ‘surprises’.  A comparison of the South African results with those of 
countries in the original studies supports the contention that the SARB has anchored 
inflation expectations relatively well and that inflation targeting offers a useful framework 
for the management of private sector expectations.   
2.  MODERN MONETARY POLICY 
It seems appropriate to base any critical evaluation of monetary policy operation in South 
Africa, or proposal for its improvement, on a sound understanding of the objectives and 
challenges facing contemporary monetary policy.  Price stability has become widely 
accepted as the primary goal of monetary policy1
 
.  Monetarists emphasise the long-term 
effects of monetary policy in the pursuit of price stability, with Friedman (1968) calling 
attention to the lags between the implementation of monetary policy and its effects in the 
real world.  This focus on the long  term naturally drew attention to the role of 
expectations and required that purposeful monetary policy be forward-looking.   
If it is recognised that economic policy is not a once-off, static decision, there needs to be 
a  conscious  awareness of the implications of applying policy in a dynamic  setting.  
Optimal control theory has been widely used for dynamic problems, including policy 
decisions.  If the private sector is a passive participant, the benevolent policy maker could 
maximise a social outcome by making an optimal decision, based on the state of the 
economy at the time and the historical development of policy up to that point.  
                                                       
 
1 This approach acknowledges that monetary policy is not an appropriate way of pursuing economic growth, 
but that price stability is a prerequisite for achieving sustainable growth and job creation.     
In practice, policy decisions are complicated by the fact that the setting in which they are 
typically made is dynamic in terms of the interaction between thinking agents over time.  
Not only do policy makers assess the environment and make decisions they deem best, 
but the public also acts in its own best interests.  Monetary policy models have largely 
been based on the assumption that decision makers form expectations in a ‘rational’ way.  
This calls attention to the strategic nature of the interaction.  Through their economic 
decisions, the private sector and monetary authorities impact on one another’s decisions.  
These ideas have had substantial implications for policy, guided by compelling 
developments in the theory2
 
.  
In an evaluation of four monetary regimes, Mishkin (1999) identifies the use of a nominal 
anchor as a fundamental commonality.  He narrowly describes a nominal anchor as ‘a 
constraint on the value of domestic money’ and more broadly ‘a constraint on 
discretionary policy’ (1999: 1).  He concludes that transparency and accountability are 
essential to this end, regardless of the specific strategy adopted by the country.  By 
maintaining transparency, central banks are allowing themselves to be held accountable 
and limiting their own discretion.    
 
In conclusion, transparency, accountability, credibility, and commitment to rules-based 
policies have become central to the implementation of modern monetary policy.  When 
policy makers commit themselves to greater transparency and accountability in a way that 
is believable, they give their policy credibility.  If policy makers’ commitment to low 
inflation is regarded as trustworthy, the markets should believe that inflationary spikes are 
transitory.  The market’s inflation expectations of the longer-term future would remain 
low;  therefore,  markets would not adjust their  decisions in a way that adds  upward 
inflationary pressure.  This would allow the monetary authority to use less aggressive 
adjustments to their instrument in order to maintain price stability, and the cost of tighter 
monetary policy on output (the sacrifice ratio) would be lower.  In this sense there is a 
strategic reason for coordination between the financial markets and the central bank.   
3.  REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE: TRANSPARENCY AND CREDIBILITY OF 
SOUTH AFRICAN MONETARY POLICY 
Current discussion surrounding inflation expectations and the degree to which the SARB 
is effectively managing inflation expectations in South Africa is dominated by analyses of 
macroeconomic trends, inflation expectation surveys, and ‘break-even’ rates (the 
difference between nominal and inflation-indexed bonds of similar maturity) – see Reid 
                                                       
 
2 Theoretical developments of particular relevance are:  the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976), the understanding 
that policy can be time inconsistent (Kydland and Prescott, 1977), and the definition of monetary policy as a 
path of policy stances over time (Sargent and Wallace, 1981).  For a survey of work on credibility since 1981 
see Walsh (2003).   
 (2009), for a more comprehensive discussion of these.  However, none of the above 
measures directly examines the relationship between the changes in the monetary policy 
instrument and other market interest rates.   
 
Ballim and Moolman (2005) contribute to the literature by investigating the impact of 
changes in the repo rate on a range of financial market instruments in order to capture 
the response of interest rates at different horizons.  These include forward rate 
agreements (FRAs) with maturities of less than a year and government bonds with longer 
maturities.  Using a variety of empirical tests, they find strong correlations (diminishing 
with longer horizons) between movements in the repo rate and short-term interest rates, 
and they find that the majority of the market adjustment occurs before the decision is 
announced, suggesting that markets are anticipating changes in the repo rate. 
 
Aron and Muellbauer (2006) extend the former study by using FRAs with different 
dimensions to identify the expectations of the markets regarding following policy 
decisions more clearly.  However, their results are similar to those of Ballim and 
Moolman (2005).   
 
These two studies begin to  empirically scrutinise the causal relationship between 
monetary policy and market interest rates.  Aron and Muellbauer (2006) still question the 
strong policy conclusions drawn by Ballim and Moolman and propose that a comparison 
of the magnitudes of the responses with those of another country would provide more 
indication of the room for improvement.  
 
To avoid measurement error, it is also preferable to use the ‘surprise’ (the difference 
between the forecasted value and the actual value realised) of the market after the 
announcement of a monetary policy decision as the independent variable, rather than 
simply to use the change in the repo rate.  The markets may be surprised by the failure of 
the SARB to adjust the repo rate, or conversely, a change in the policy rate may be 
entirely anticipated.  The surprise component provides a more precise measure of the 
new information presented to the market, to be considered when pricing instruments. 
These issues will be addressed by the empirical study in the following section.   
4.  THE SENSITIVITY OF INFLATION EXPECTATIONS TO ‘SURPRISES’ IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Recent work in a series of papers beginning with Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a), 
have offered exciting new insights. They investigated the impact of new information 
(macroeconomic data and monetary policy ‘surprises’) on short- and long-term interest 
rates (the term structure of the interest rate).    
 Using advances in the literature regarding how to measure the market’s expectations of 
interest rates and inflation in a period far into the future, Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson 
(2005a) find that long-term expectations (as captured by the long-term forward inflation 
compensation rates) in the US are not as well anchored3 as one might have expected.  
Subsequent research found that long-term inflation expectations in the US and in pre-
1997 UK (before the Bank of England (BoE)  gained independence4
 
) were far more 
sensitive to surprise information than those of Sweden and post-1997 UK (Gürkaynack, 
Levin and Swanson, 2006).  They interpreted this as evidence that anchoring long-term 
inflation expectations was enhanced through inflation targeting.   
These findings were reinforced through a study by Mauricio Larrain (2005) from the 
Central Bank of Chile, who examined the effect of monetary policy surprises on the term 
structure of interest rates in Chile.  He found that inflation expectations in Chile (an 
emerging market) compared favourably with those of the US.  The study by Gürkaynack, 
Sack and Swanson has also been extended to test its applicability to Canada and Chile 
(Gürkaynack, Levin, Marder and Swanson, 2005).  The results bolstered those of the 
original study, with the forward inflation compensation (difference between the forward 
rates of nominal and real bonds) of Canada and Chile not showing significant responses 
to domestic macroeconomic data and monetary policy surprises.  An interesting 
peculiarity of this article is that the Canadian far-ahead interest rates did show a degree of 
sensitivity to news from the US, although it was still less than the response of the US.   
 
That inflation-targeting central banks are more credible than the Federal Reserve Bank 
would be an unpersuasive argument.  It is more likely that the systematic implementation 
and communication of monetary policy in the inflation targeting countries reduces the 
uncertainty experienced by financial markets in these countries.  If a central bank were 
more transparent about its plans for future policy, it would potentially be able to shape 
market expectations more directly and improve coordination.   
 
In this section, the methodology of Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) is applied in 
order to more directly evaluate the link between monetary policy and the financial 
markets in South Africa.  It sheds light on the degree to which the international findings 
of Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) are applicable to South Africa, and 
investigates how well inflation expectations have been anchored in South Africa over the 
past five years, relative to countries discussed in other articles above.   
 
                                                       
 
3 A nominal anchor should convince the public that the authorities will control inflation in the long run.  
Therefore, the longer-term inflation expectations of the public should not react strongly to new information.   
4 The hypothesis is that an independent BoE should have more credibility because it reduces the extent to 
which the government can use monetary policy to pursue other goals and sacrifice the attainment of the 
BoE’s objectives.    a) Data and Methodology 
As with many studies performed in less developed countries, the availability of data, 
especially in the form required, was a challenge.5
 
  Following the model of Gürkaynack, 
Sack and Swanson (2005a), variables were created to capture the ‘surprise’ experienced by 
the markets, following a number of macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy 
decisions; and the variable ‘forward inflation compensation’ was created as a measure of 
the inflation expectations of the markets.   
This enables an estimate of the impact of the surprises on the inflation expectations of 
the market during this period, using the following regression:   
 
  t t t t t t t REPO PPI CA GDP CPIX FIC ε β β β β β α + + + + + + = ∆ 5 4 3 2 1            (1) 
 
The change in the forward inflation compensation on day t ( t FIC ∆ ) was regressed on 
the surprise components of the macroeconomic announcements on the corresponding 
day t.  CPIX, GDP, CA and PPI are the surprise components of the consumer price 
index (excluding mortgage costs), gross domestic product, current account and producer 
price index data releases respectively; and REPO is the surprise component  of the 
monetary policy decision regarding the setting of the repo rate.   t ε  represents the factors 
that influence forward inflation compensation other than regressors used.   
 
The data set consists of daily observations of the changes in the inflation compensation 
on the day of each announcement.  Only days on which an announcement was made are 
included, and usually only one announcement took place each date.  So on any particular 
date, only one non-zero surprise was measured and all the other surprises on that date 
would be recorded as zero.  The regression results can be interpreted as the extent to 
which inflation compensation responds (on average) to the surprise components of 
macroeconomic announcements over the sample period (May 2002 - March 2007)6
 
. 
a) i)  Macroeconomic surprises 
The ‘surprise’ component of the macroeconomic data announcements was isolated to 
reflect the fact that the balance of the movement of the macroeconomic data is not 
                                                       
 
5 In a footnote, Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson (2006) identify some of the ways in which data limitations 
(which tend to be worse in developing countries) have frustrated efforts to apply their methods to other 
inflation targeting countries.   
6 The sample period was limited May 2002-March 2007 for practical, data collection reasons.  The start of the 
sample was limited by the dates at which the inflation indexed government bonds were introduced, and the 
reason that the sample period ends in 2007 is that the construction of the dataset that preceded this study 
began in mid-2007.    ‘news’ to them and will therefore not be responsible for the movements of the interest 
rates.  Abrupt movements of the interest rate shortly after the announcement would 
reflect the extent to which they misjudged the actual outcome.  This is the extent to 
which the markets have received new information which has not yet been reflected in the 
pricing.  Using the surprise component of the variables also limits the possibility of 
endogeneity, because the expected feedback from the interest rates to the 
macroeconomic variables is removed when constructing the surprise variables 
(Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006).  To capture the surprise of the markets at the 
release of macroeconomic data, Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005) calculated the 
difference between the actual data released and the median forecast of a panel of 
professional forecasters, polled shortly before that data release.     
 
  forecast median  release   actual surprise − =                                     (2)  
 
For the purposes of this study of the South African situation, the macroeconomic 
variables considered were CPIX, PPI, GDP and CA.  These were selected due to the 
availability of survey data and their high degree of relevance to inflation expectations.   
 
With regard to the actual data releases, Van Walbeeck (2006) recently expressed concern 
regarding the size of the official revisions to South African national accounts data, and 
the impact of these on econometric studies using this data.  He found that the official 
figures were often adjusted substantially as more accurate information became available 
to the statistical authorities.  The implication for the data set used in this study is that the 
surprise experienced by the market following a data release may be dispersed over time, 
as the official figures are revised.  On consideration, first-release data was used, because, 
as Van Walbeeck (2006) pointed out, the first release receives the most attention.     
 
A series of consensus forecasts were required to capture the expectations of the markets 
regarding the relevant macroeconomic variables.  The median of forecasts from the panel 
of economists was used (rather than the mean) in order to limit the influence of changes 
in composition of the panel, and to minimise the effect of outliers.   
 
The precise publication dates of the data were necessary to match the forecast and actual 
data releases accurately, and then to match these surprise components with the 
movement in the forward inflation compensation on the day of each ‘surprise’.   
 
CPIX:  
The first releases of CPIX were collected from consecutive issues of the SARB Quarterly 
Bulletin (2002 - 2007) by collecting only the last figures, which had not yet been revised, 
from each issue.  Publication dates were provided by Stats SA and were compared with media reports, where available (Business Day – various issues, 2002 - 2007), to confirm 
that there were no discrepancies due to delayed data releases.   
 
To capture the market’s expectations of the CPIX, the Reuters ‘Econometer’7  was 
considered first, as it is a comprehensive and reputable survey that has been conducted 
since October 1999.   Unfortunately, although the economists are polled monthly, they 
forecast for the end of the quarter; therefore, matching the CPIX data releases (released 
monthly) with the forecast becomes a bit contrived8.  The Beeld newspaper’s ‘economist 
of the year’  competition posed the same problem.  This increases the potential for 
measurement error and simultaneity.   Alternatively, a series of surveys conducted by 
Bloomberg (2002 - 2007)9
 
 within the week leading up to the data release was used for the 
forecast of CPIX.  This allowed the surprise resulting from each individual release to be 
captured more accurately.   
Figure I: 





















































































































































Expectation Actual Release Surprise Component
 
Source:   Bloomberg, the SARB Quarterly Bulletins (2002 - 2007), Stats SA (as above).   
  Surprise component – own calculation.  
 
Figure I  shows the actual CPIX series, the forecast CPIX series and the surprise 
component.  The actual and forecast series run relatively closely together, which is 
confirmed by the dotted line representing the surprise component, which fluctuates 
gently around zero.   
 
                                                       
 
7 Forecasts of a panel of professional economists.   
8 Although Reuters do survey the market’s expectations of some data releases for a shorter horizon, only the 
past two years worth of surveys were available in their archives at any time.   
9 Bloomberg conducts surveys for a small range of macroeconomic data releases.  A panel of professional 
economists is surveyed in the week leading up to the data releases.    PPI:  
The PPI is also released monthly.  Both the first releases of the actual data and the 
forecasts (conducted in the week leading up to the data release) were received from 
Bloomberg.  The dates on which the data was published were collected from consecutive, 
electronic statistical publications (Stats SA, 2002 - 2007).   
 
Figure II: 



















































































































































Expectation Actual Release Surprise Component
 
Source:   Bloomberg, Stats SA (as above).   
  Surprise component – own calculation.  
 
GDP: 
Publication dates of the quarterly GDP series were collected from consecutive, electronic 
statistical publications by Stats SA (2002 - 2007).  The first releases of the actual data were 
collected from the SARB Quarterly Bulletins (2002 - 2007).  The GDP forecasts were 
received from Bloomberg.   
 Figure III: 



























































































































Expectation Actual Release Surprise Component
 
Source:   Bloomberg, the SARB Quarterly Bulletins (2002 - 2007), Stats SA (as above).   
  Surprise component – own calculation.  
 
Current Account:  
The first releases of the actual data were collected from consecutive issues of the SARB 
Quarterly Bulletin (2002 - 2007).  The dates on which the SARB Quarterly Bulletins were 
released by the Reserve Bank, which would be the first public release of the current 
account data, was provided by the SARB10
 
.   
Bloomberg did not provide forecasts of the current account releases the week before the 
data release.  Instead, the Reuters Econometer was used, but this was not as much of a 
problem as for the CPIX, as the actual current account data is only released once per 
quarter.  As described above, the Reuters panel forecasts their expectation monthly for 
the end of the quarter; therefore, there are three forecasts for each quarter.  The last 
forecast of the three before the release of the actual current account data (here the panel 
forecasts for the end of the month) was used in an attempt to capture the market’s 
expectation of the current account balance as close to the data release as possible.   
 
                                                       
 
10  Gratitude is expressed to Adri Cronjé of the SARB for providing the dates on which the Quarterly 
























































































Expectation Actual Release Surprise Component
 
Source:   The SARB, the SARB Quarterly Bulletin (various issues, 2002 - 2007), Reuters Econometer.   
  Surprise component – own calculation. 
 
In order to ensure comparability of the macroeconomic ‘surprises’ and ease 
interpretation, the different macroeconomic surprises were normalised, by dividing each 
series by its standard error (Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson, 2005a).  The coefficient on 
each macroeconomic surprise in the regression should be interpreted as the variation in 
the forward inflation compensation caused by a 1 standard deviation of the surprise.   
 
a)  ii)  Monetary policy surprises 
The surprise component for monetary policy was calculated using market data rather than 
the surveys, as this is available at a much higher frequency and is of a higher quality.  The 
change in the three-month Bankers Acceptance (BA) Rate (the SARB, 2007) on the day 
after the monetary policy committee (MPC) makes its statement11
 
 was used as a proxy for 
this surprise component.  The MPC announcement is made at 3pm, whereas the BA rate 
is set by the banks at midday; therefore, the BA rate would only reflect any surprise 
experienced by the markets the following day.   
The monetary policy surprise series was not normalised, and the coefficient on repo is 
interpretable as the basis point variation in the forward interest rate, due to a basis point 
variation in the monetary policy surprise variable.  Bear in mind that the MPC statement 
communicates the decision of the monetary policy committee regarding the present 
changes in the policy instrument, but it may also provide an indication of the possible 
future policy stance of the committee.   
                                                       
 
11 Dates of MPC meetings from MPC statements (2002 – 2007). According to the Fisher equation, the nominal interest rate can be decomposed into the 
real interest rate and inflation expectations:   
   
e
t t t π r i 1 + + =                                                                                                (3) 
 
where   t i  = nominal interest rate 
  t r  = real interest rate 
 
e
t π 1 +  = inflation expectations 
 
Svensson (1994) proposed the use of forward interest rates for analysing monetary policy, 
because a forward interest rate is related to an ordinary yield curve in the same manner as 
average and marginal cost curves are related.  Forward rates at a long-term horizon, show 
the expected short-term interest rates at that horizon.  Relying on the Fisher equation, 
forward inflation compensation at a particular horizon can be presented as the difference 
between nominal and real forward rates at that horizon:   
 
Fwd inflation compensation = nom fwd rate – real fwd rate                               (4) 
 
Inflation compensation is,  however,  an imprecise measure of inflation expectations, 
because according to the asset pricing model, a term for the risk premium should be 
added to the Fisher equation (the nominal interest rate should be decomposed into the 
real interest rate, expected inflation, and the risk premium).   
 
Both Sack (2002) and Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson (2006) acknowledge that inflation 
compensation does not capture expected inflation precisely,  and they do not lightly 
disregard the influence of risk premia, but they insist that these factors do not discredit 
their results.  If the variations in the risk premia over time are at lower frequencies than 
the daily variations in forward inflation compensation (the dependent variable), the risk 
premia should not have much influence on the coefficient estimates (Gürkaynack, Levin 
and Swanson,  2006).  Even if the premia decrease substantially over time, their 
movement in one day will be very small.  
 
b)  Regression results 
The original studies (Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson, 2005a, and Gürkaynack, Levin and 
Swanson, 2006) use dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)  models as 
benchmarks, from which they emphasise two important observations.  Firstly, in 
agreement with a variety of macroeconomic models, the DSGE models show that within 
five (or at least ten) years,  the short-term interest rates return to their steady state.  Secondly, if the short-term interest rate is approximately the average of all short-term 
interest rates over the life of the bond, then it follows that this long-term interest rate will 
move when economic news is released, as the shorter-term interest rates will respond.  
However, the forward rate at a long horizon (between years four and five, or nine and ten 
in this case) should not respond to economic news in the present time period if inflation 
expectations are well anchored and transitory responses to shocks disappear before the 
long-term horizon is reached13
 
.  If the forward interest rates at the long horizons do 
respond, it suggests that there is pass-through of the economic shock to the inflation 
expectations.   
b)  i)  Results of this study   
Over the sample period of this study, South Africa was an inflation targeter, and the one-
year forward inflation compensations – ending in five and ten year’s time – are expected 
to be well anchored.  Using the variables created above, this was investigated by 
regressing the nominal spot rate and forward inflation compensation rates on the surprise 
variables, using the method of ordinary least squares adopted by Gürkaynack, Sack and 
Swanson.14
 
    
                                                       
 
13 Based on the benchmark DSGE models, the system should have reached a steady state by five (or at least 
ten) year’s time, and therefore, the transitory responses should have died out (Gürkaynack, Levin and 
Swanson, 2006).   
14 As mentioned earlier, the possibility of endogeneity due to the impact of interest rates on the macro 
economy is limited by using the surprise component of the macroeconomic data releases.  In addition, using 
auxillary regressions and Klein’s rule of thumb, the level of multicollinearity was judged not to be a serious 
concern.  The regressions do suffer from positive autocorrelation, so Newey-West standard errors are 
reported in Table I.   Table I:  Impact of Macroeconomic Surprises on Spot and Forward Inflation Compensation Rates 
Note:  The sample period for the study is May 2002 to March 2007.  The numbers in the columns are the 
coefficient values and those in brackets are the corresponding standard errors (Newey-West statndard errors were 
used).  The coefficient on each of the macroeconomic surprises should be interpreted as the variation in the forward 
inflation compensation caused by a 1 standard deviation of the surprise.  The coefficient on REPO is interpretable 
as the basis point variation in the forward interest rate due to the variation in the monetary policy surprise variable, 
measured in basis points.  *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% 
level.  The probably value of the F statistic represents the probability that all the coefficients are jointly equal to zero.   
 
The surprise components of the macroeconomic data and monetary policy 
announcements are listed vertically, in rows, in Table I above.  The regression results 
reporting the sensitivity of the one-year spot to these surprise components are presented 
in the first column, and the sensitivity of the one-year forward inflation compensation 
ending in one year’s time is presented in column two of Table I.  Column one has two 
highly significant coefficients and the R2 of 9.2% suggests that these variables do explain 
a portion (9.2%) of the variation in the nominal rate. The probability of the F statistic 
(0.7%) indicates that the hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero can be 
rejected even at the 1% level of significance.  Similarly, column two has three significant 
coefficients, an R2 of 8.8% and the probability of the F statistic of 1%.  Although the R2 
of these two regressions shows that a substantial amount of the variation in the nominal 
rate and the inflation compensation ending in one year’s time is not explained by the 
surprise variables included in the regressions, the significant variables and highly 
significant F statistic show that the regression variables do contain some information 
relevant for the movement of short-term interest rates.  These statistics are also 
comparable to the international results in the original studies, which are discussed in the 
following section.  The question is whether this information passes through to long-term 
inflation expectations (whether the markets believe the shocks are transitory).  
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Number of observations  168  168  168  168 
R2  0.092  0.088  0.039  0.007 
Prob (F-statistic)      0.007***      0.010***  0.266  0.948  
 Columns three and four, analysing the sensitivity of the one-year forward inflation 
compensation ending in five and ten year’s time to the surprise components, attempts to 
answer this question.  The coefficients get progressively less significant, while the R2 
decreases and the F-statistic increases. The results of inflation compensation at the ten-
year horizon are especially strong.  All the coefficients are insignificant, the R2 suggests 
that only 0.7% of the variation in the inflation compensation can be explained by the 
surprises, and the probability of the F statistic (0.948) suggests that the hypothesis that all 
coefficients are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected.  The crucial point is how the 
statistics have changed.  For example, the R2 of 0.7% at the ten-year horizon is less than 
one thirteenth (7.6%) of the size of the R2 of the one-year inflation compensation ending 
in ten year’s time.   
 
It is also interesting to contrast the persistence of the effects of the announcements in 
South Africa with those of the United States, as described by Gürkaynack, Sack and 
Swanson (2005a).  In Figure VI the regression coefficients for South Africa (with 95% 
confidence intervals) are plotted to depict the impact of each surprise variable on one 
year forward rates ending in 1 to 10 years time.  The coefficients of each of the variables 
in the present study reach around zero within a ten year period, with the coefficient for 
GDP reaching zero as quickly as 3 years.  In contrast, the results in Gürkaynack, Sack and 
Swanson (2005a) show that the effects for many of the variables in the United States take 
up to 15 years to reach zero. 
 









Source:  Own calculations15
 
 
b)  ii)  Comparison with international findings 
The results for South Africa in the previous section are in line with those of Gürkaynack, 
Levin and Swanson (2006) for Sweden and the UK (after the BoE was granted 
independence), and those of Gürkaynack, Levin, Marder and Swanson (2005) for Chile16
 
, 
which are summarised in Table II.  Notice that all these countries adopt the inflation 
targeting framework.   
Comparing the results for the nominal spot rate and the one-year inflation compensation 
ending in ten year’s time, the coefficients for the surprise variables in Sweden and the UK 
(post- central bank independence) become substantially less significant.  The R2 decreased 
from 7% to 1% in Sweden and from 24% to 3% in the UK after BoE independence.  
The Chilean example as an emerging market inflation targeter reinforces these results.   
 
It is illuminating to compare the above with the results for the US and the UK (pre-
central bank independence).  The decrease in the R2 for the US is proportionately much 
smaller and, although the significance of the coefficients decrease, five of the eleven  
 
                                                       
 
15 Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) emphasise that the 95% confidence bands do not get wider 
with longer horizons as the regressions are not predicting the level of the interest rates that will be realised 
at those horizons, but rather revisions to the expectations of those interest rates.   
 
16 The Chilean example is interesting as it is an emerging market.   Table II:  A Summary of Some of the International Results 
No. of coefficients significant at 1% level 
of significance  
8 of the 11 variables  3 of the 11 variables 
No. of coefficients significant at 5% level 
of significance 
2 of the 11 variables  2 of the 11 variables 
R2  0.16  0.05 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000***  0.000*** 
No. of coefficients significant at 1% level 
of significance  
5 of the 7 variables  2 of the 7 variables 
No. of coefficients significant at 5% level 
of significance 
0 of the 7 variables  2 of the 7 variables 
R2  0.35  0.21 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000***  0.000*** 
No. of coefficients significant at 1% level 
of significance  
6 of the 7 variables  1 of the 7 variables 
No. of coefficients significant at 5% level 
of significance 
0 of the 7 variables  0 of the 7 variables 
R2  0.24  0.03 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000***  0.051 
Sweden (Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006) 
No. of coefficients significant at 1% level 
of significance  
2 of the 8 variables  0 of the 8 variables 
No. of coefficients significant at 5% level 
of significance 
1 of the 8 variables  0 of the 8 variables 
R2  0.07  0.01 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000***  0.420 
Chile (Gürkaynack, Levin, Marder and Swanson, 2005) 
No. of coefficients significant at 1% level 
of significance  
1 of the 4 variables  0 of the 4 variables 
No. of coefficients significant at 5% level 
of significance 
0 of the 4 variables  0 of the 4 variables 
R2  0.16  0.02 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.005***  0.733 
Note:  *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.   
coefficients are still significant at the ten-year horizon.  The results are even stronger for 
the UK before central bank independence, with the R2 only decreasing from 35% to 21% 
  1-year spot rate 
 
1-year forward inflation 
compensation ending in 10 year 
US (Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006 ) 
UK (before central bank independence) (Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006 ) 
UK (after central bank independence 1998 – 2005) ( Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006 ) and clearly reflecting a strong pass-through from economic shock to inflation 
expectations at the long horizon.  Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson (2006) suggest that 
these results support the contention that the inflation targeting framework of Sweden and 
the UK,  after central bank independence,  result in a better anchoring of inflation 
expectations than the US (as a non inflation targeter) and the UK before central bank 
independence.   
5.  A MATURING REGIME 
The results in this study are compatible with the findings of Mitchell-Innes, Aziakpono 
and Faure (2007), who claim that South Africa’s inflation targeting regime is maturing.  
They tested for short run and long run Fisher effects in South Africa in the period 2000 – 
2005, in order to determine the extent to which the Fisher hypothesis held (i.e. that 
inflation expectations were constant and therefore monetary policy was able to influence 
the real interest rate over the period).  They found that the short run Fisher hypothesis 
did not hold, which they proposed was due to the way the transmission mechanism 
works under inflation targeting.  More importantly, they found that although expected 
inflation and long run nominal interest rates moved in the same direction, the relationship 
was only 0,28.  They concluded that this favourably supported the level of credibility of 
the inflation targeting regime as inflation expectations were not moving one to one with 
the nominal interest rate, and monetary policy was impacting on the real interest rate. 
 
However, despite the comparative success of the South African inflation targeting regime 
proposed by these studies, it seems appropriate to stress that credibility should not be 
taken for granted.  Lack of coordination between policy makers and the market on 
various occasions, suggests that there may be room for improvement in communication 
of the SARB.  Despite warnings of a possible rate changes by the Governor of the SARB, 
the markets were generally surprised by the April 2005 reduction, and June 2006 rise in 
the interest rate.  Data available to the market and communication from the SARB had 
not convinced the market that the threat was credible (Joffe, 2006), and analysts 
questioned the reasons given by the central bank for the interest rate decisions of 2005 
and 2006.   
 
As concluded earlier, transparency, accountability, credibility, and commitment to rules-
based policies have become central to the implementation of modern monetary policy.  
These characteristics encourage coordination between the financial markets and the 
SARB, in the sense that the financial markets believe the SARB to be credible and 
therefore adjust their inflation expectations as the SARB wishes them to.  This does not 
suggest any duress, but rather that the SARB and the financial markets, as players in a 
strategic game, have decided that it is in each of their own best interests to cooperate 
(Reid, 2008).   6.  CONCLUSION 
It is important to realise that, although some of the most successful and influential central 
banks have chosen not to adopt inflation targeting, their execution of monetary policy is 
converging with that of the inflation targeting central banks (King, 2004).  Both groups 
recognise the strategic nature of monetary policy and use communication and 
transparency extensively in order to influence expectations and increase the effectiveness 
of monetary policy.   The methodology of Gürkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005) was 
applied to South African data in this paper and the results were encouraging.  The 
sensitivity of South African inflation expectations for the period under review is 
comparable with inflation targeting countries analysed in international studies, suggesting 
that inflation targeting is offering a useful framework for monetary authorities in South 
Africa to communicate with the public and thereby anchor inflation expectations.  
However, credibility building is not a once-off exercise.  The SARB should continually 
strive to promote coordination with the financial markets through transparent and 
predictable monetary policy.   
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